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Suing the Firearms Industry: A Case for
Federal Reform
Stephen P. Halbrook*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A wave of lawsuits against the firearms industry for criminal
acts of third parties crested and substantially evaporated during
the 1980s. Primarily brought by individual plaintiffs, these suits
alleged a variety of theories of negligence (including negligent
design and marketing), strict liability for defective (actually
nondefective) products, and ultra-hazardous activity. Since the
firearms at issue worked properly and were made and
distributed lawfully, these cases were by and large dismissed as
failing to allege cognizable claims.1
While such individual actions continue to be brought and are
usually dismissed,2 in the late 1990s municipalities began to
* Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Virginia; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D.
Philosophy, Florida State University. Argued Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) and other firearms cases in the Supreme Court. Author of FIREARMS LAW
DESKBOOK (West 2003) and three books on the right to bear arms.
See
www.stephenhalbrook.com. Copyright © 2004 by Stephen P. Halbrook. All rights
reserved.
1 E.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
there is no duty where crime victims had no special relation with manufacturers); Bennet
v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (holding that there is no
duty where no special relationship existed between gun manufacturer and person injured
by misuse of gun); Riordan v. Intíl Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (finding that a manufacturer of nondefective handgun had no duty to control
distribution of product to general public). But see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d
1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (finding liability for ìSaturday Night Specialî), superseded by MD.
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY ß 5-402(b) (2003).
2 E.g., Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that
ìother courts faced with similar issues have almost uniformly refused to impose any duty
on businesses related to the legal use and distribution of firearms owed to those harmed
by the misuse of those firearms.î); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Engíg, Inc., 900
S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark. 1995) (finding no special relation between manufacturer and
handgun purchaser); Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 953 (Md. 1999) (finding
that the inherent danger of guns creates no duty of dealers to persons who may be
harmed); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding appeal to be vexatious and awarding attorneyís fees; suit involved stolen weapon
used in murder). See also TIMOTHY A. BUMANN, THE COMPENDIUM OF REPORTED UNITED
STATES FIREARMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SYNOPSIS OF CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST
MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS (1995).
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bring similar lawsuits against the firearms industry. The same
theories continued to be alleged but a new one was added: public
nuisance. Under this theory, it is alleged that the firearms
industry intentionally supplies the criminal market by
manufacturing more firearms than lawful demand would
support. During 1998-2003, some thirty-three municipalities and
counties filed suits against the firearms industry.3
The following briefly analyzes some representative cases of
the current litigation against the firearms industry, including
discussion of the public nuisance theory and the effect on the
constitutionally-guaranteed right to keep and bear arms.4 It
then provides a detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuitís Ileto v.
Glock Inc.5 decision, which pushes the envelope by basing its
claim of wrongdoing on the marketing of guns to police
departments in States with less strict firearm laws. Lastly, this
Article evaluates the provisions of the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, which is pending in the United States
Congress and would preempt these types of suits against the
firearms industry.
II. IS THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS A PUBLIC NUISANCE?
Typical allegations made in the current wave of antiindustry lawsuits are summarized in Camden County Board of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,6 as follows:
[T]he manufacturers release into the market substantially
more handguns than they expect to sell to law-abiding
purchasers; the manufacturers continue to use certain
distribution channels, despite knowing (often from specific
crime-gun trace reports produced by the federal Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) that those channels regularly
yield criminal end-users . . . . The County makes no allegation
that any manufacturer violated any federal or state statute or
regulation governing the manufacture and distribution of
firearms, and no direct link is alleged between any
manufacturer and any specific criminal act.7

3 Litigation
Against
the
Gun
Industry,
Violence
Policy
Ctr.,
http://www.vpc.org/litigate.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2004); Taxpayer Funded Reckless
Lawsuits
Against
The
Firearms
Industry,
Natíl
Rifle
Assoc.,
http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=147 (posted Aug. 19, 2003).
4 The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, ìA well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.î For a current listing of State arms guarantees, see
Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions,
http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/beararms/statecon.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
5 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
6 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001).
7 Id. at 539.

HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28

13

5/28/2004 4:19 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:11

Actually, manufacturers become aware of traces when the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ìBATFî) requests
information, but a mere trace request does not imply that any of
the links in a distribution channel committed any wrongdoing or
even that a crime was committed with the firearm traced.8 At
any rate, the Third Circuit held that ìno New Jersey court has
ever allowed a public nuisance claim to proceed against
manufacturers for lawful products that are lawfully placed in the
stream of commerce.î9 It added, ìTo extend public nuisance law
to embrace the manufacture of handguns would be
unprecedented under New Jersey state law and unprecedented
nationwide for an appellate court.î10
In Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.,11 Floridaís Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of all theories of
liability in Miami-Dade Countyís suit against the firearms
industry.12 Noting that virtually all appellate decisions from
other states precluded liability, the court relied on Florida
precedent holding that liability does not exist where the firearm
was not defective, its manufacture and distribution were
consistent with state and federal law, and no duty was breached
by the defendants.13 Penelas observed:
The Countyís request that the trial court use its injunctive
powers to mandate the redesign of firearms and declare that
the appelleesí business methods create a public nuisance, is an
attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through the
medium of the judiciary. Clearly this round-about attempt is
being made because of the Countyís frustration at its inability
to directly regulate firearms, an exercise proscribed by section
790.33, Florida Statutes (1999) which expressly preempts to
8 Traces frequently implicate nothing about the first retail purchaser, much less the
licensee. According to the U.S. Solicitor General: ìIf the tracing process is successful, it
will identify the first retail purchaser of the traced firearm; yet that person may have long
since relinquished ownership of the weapon and may have no connection to the
underlying crime.î Brief for the Petitioner at 27, BATF v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229
(2003) (No. 02-322) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, ìbecause the agency requesting
the trace does not inform ATF of whether possessors and their associates are ever
indicted or convicted of any offense, ATF has no way of knowing whether the law
enforcement agency requesting the trace believes the possessor or associate to have had
any role in the crime.î Id. at 10 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Finally,
ìATF has informed this Office that approximately 30% of all trace requests do not tie the
weapon to any individual possessor.î Id. at 41.
9 Camden, 273 F.3d at 540.
10 Id. at 540-41. See also City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415,
419 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting liability of firearm manufacturers under negligence,
negligent entrustment, and public nuisance theories for costs incurred by city associated
with the criminal use of handguns).
11 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
12 Id. at 1044.
13 Id. (citing Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)) (finding no liability for shotgun).
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the state legislature the entire field of firearm and ammunition
regulation. The Countyís frustration cannot be alleviated
through litigation as the judiciary is not empowered to ìenactî
regulatory measures in the guise of injunctive relief.14

The court cited references for ìadditional discussions of the
right to bear arms,î15 but did not explicitly quote Floridaís arms
guarantee.16 Of course, where clear statutory grounds exist for a
decision, courts prefer not to raise constitutional issues. But in
the final analysis, one wonders how the lawful manufacture and
distribution of a constitutionally-guaranteed product could give
rise to liability.17
Several states have statutes which explicitly preempt
municipal regulation of firearms or specifically prohibit
municipalities from bringing actions of the type discussed here.18
Id. at 1045 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1045 n.6.
Article I, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution provides: ìThe right of the people to
keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall
not be infringed . . . .î
17 Long before the rise of suits against the manufacturers, suits seeking to impose
liability on firearm owners for possessing or using firearms were held to be precluded by
the existence of the right to bear arms. See McKellar v. Mason, 159 So. 2d 700, 701-02
(La. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that an elderly manís use of firearm in self-defense did not
expose him to liability, and stating that, ìThe Constitutions of the United States and
Louisiana give us the right to keep and bear arms. It follows, logically, that to keep and
bear arms gives us the right to use the arms for the intended purpose for which they were
manufactured.î); Lopez v. Chewiwie, 186 P.2d 512, 513 (N.M. 1947) (holding that parent
who kept loaded firearm in home with unattended child is not liable for tort committed by
minor, relying in part on the state constitutional right to bear arms). Of course, a parent
may be liable for negligence. E.g., Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 404 (Pa. 1957)
(holding that, ìcommon prudence, in behalf of self-protection, justified the possession of
the pistol for immediate use at night,î but owner negligent to absent himself and leave it
ìin a place frequented by young children.î).
18 As an example, Florida provides:
(1) Preemption.ñ Except as expressly provided by general law, the Legislature
hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms
and ammunition, including the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture,
ownership, possession, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all
existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or regulations
relating thereto. Any such existing ordinances are hereby declared null and
void . . . .
14
15
16

....
(3) Policy and intent. ñ (a) It is the intent of this section to provide uniform
firearms laws in the state; to declare all ordinances and regulations null and
void which have been enacted by any jurisdictions other than state and federal,
which regulate firearms, ammunition, or components thereof; to prohibit the
enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to firearms,
ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically authorized by this
section or general law; and to require local jurisdictions to enforce state
firearms laws.
FLA. STAT. ANN. ß 790.33 (West 2000). An example of the more recently passed
preemption provisions which explicitly prohibit municipal lawsuits against the firearms
industry is found in Louisiana:
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Municipal suits against the firearms industry have been
dismissed under such statutes; courts have ruled that
municipalities have no due process rights which would negate
such statutes.19 It has also been held that cities have no direct
injury from criminal violence and, thus, have no standing to sue
the firearms industry.20
In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta,21 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that all claims should be dismissed because
the State preempted the field of gun regulation and also because
a recent statute prohibited municipalities from bringing such
suits.22 The court traced the source of the legislatureís authority
directly to the stateís arms guarantee:
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983
provides: ìThe right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to
prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.î The
General Assembly has exercised this power given by the
Constitution to create a regulatory scheme for the distribution
and use of firearms.23
A. The governing authority of any political subdivision or local or other
governmental authority of the state is precluded and preempted from bringing
suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade
association, or dealer for damages for injury, death, or loss or to seek other
injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture,
marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition. The authority to bring such
actions as may be authorized by law shall be reserved exclusively to the state.
B. This Section shall not prohibit the governing authority of a political
subdivision or local or other governing authority of the state from bringing an
action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or
dealer for breach of contract as to firearms or ammunition purchased by the
political subdivision or local authority of the state.
LA. REV. STAT. Ann. ß 40:1799 (West 2001).
19 E.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 11 (La. 2001) (holding that the
municipal suit was an indirect attempt to regulate lawful firearm manufacture, the state
statute precluding such suits applied retroactively, and that municipalities have no due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc.,
669 N.W.2d 845, 856-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the municipality lacked
standing to contest the state preemption statute on due process grounds, and the statute
did not violate separation of powers).
20 E.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 118 (Conn. 2001).
21 560 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
22 Id. at 527, 531-32.
23 Id. at 529 (citing Rhodes v. R. G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 466 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984)). Rhodes in turn explained:
Appellant first contends that ìthe trial court erred in holding as a matter of
law that handguns are exempt from Georgiaís product liability law because the
lack of safety connected with such weapons raises a political, nonjusticiable
question.î Her last contention is that the trial court erroneously held as a
matter of law that the R.G. revolver is not unreasonably dangerous when
marketed to the general public. We disagree on both points. The Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of the people to keep
and bear arms, as does Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII of the Georgia Constitution
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In several cases, courts have refused to grant motions to
dismiss and the cases have proceeded to discovery. Most were
thereafter dismissed when discovery yielded no evidence
supporting the allegations that the firearms industry
intentionally and purposely distributed firearms to criminals.
For instance, the trial-level Superior Court of Massachusetts
characterized Bostonís public nuisance theory as ìunique in the
Commonwealth,î but declined to dismiss the case on the
pleadings.24 However, after nearly three years of litigation,
Boston agreed to a dismissal of its lawsuit against the industry
and even acknowledged that the industry had made
commitments to safety.25 It would appear that Boston simply
could not prove that the industry intentionally distributed
firearms to criminals.
The path of Cincinnatiís suit against the industry is
intriguing. The Ohio Constitution provides that ì[t]he people
have the right to bear arms for their defense and security,î26 and
the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated that ìthe right to bear
arms is fundamental.î27 However, when it came to deciding that
a public nuisance action existed against the firearms industry,
that right was not so much as mentioned. In City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,28 the Court upheld the cause of action,
stating: ìEven though there exists a comprehensive regulatory
scheme involving the manufacturing, sales, and distribution of
firearms, . . . the law does not regulate the distribution practices
alleged in the complaint.î29
Yet it was perhaps those allegations which would be the
Achillesí heel of the plaintiffsí own case. The Court remarked,
ìWhile we do not predict the outcome of this case, we would be
1983 . . . .
Rhodes, 325 S.E.2d at 466.
24 City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 352, at *63-64 (July 13, 2000).
25 In dismissing its case, Boston and the industry agreed to a joint statement which
stated in part:
The City acknowledges that the members of the Industry and firearms trade
associations are genuinely concerned with and are committed to, the safe, legal
and responsible sale and use of their products. . . . The Industry and the City
believe that through cooperation and communication they can continue to
reduce the number of firearm related accidents, can increase awareness of the
issues related to the safe handling and storage of firearms, and can reduce the
criminal acquisition of firearms.
Plaintiffsí Unopposed Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A at 3-4, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., No. 99-02590-C (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2001).
26 OHIO CONST. art. I, ß 4.
27 Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ohio 2003).
28 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
29 Id. at 1143.
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remiss if we did not recognize the importance of allowing this
type of litigation to go past the pleading stages.î30 After the case
was remanded for trial and discovery was completed, the City of
Cincinnati voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit.31 Stanley Chesley,
counsel for the City, advised that ìhe could not justify moving
forward with the cityís 4-year-old lawsuit against the gun
industry, dealing a major disappointment to gun control
advocates across the nation.î32 Lawrence Keane, counsel for the
National Shooting Sports Foundation, stated: ìëThe city canít
prove the allegations, because theyíre not true . . . . Theyíre
unbelievably offensive, outrageous and patently false.î33 Thus,
Cincinnatiís lawsuit went the way of Bostonísódown the tubes.
The most active litigation against the firearms industry has
undoubtedly proceeded before federal Judge Jack Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York. In these cases he frequently
allows causes of action to go forward against the gun
manufacturers on multiple theories, despite consistent reversal
by the Second Circuit. In Hamilton v. Accu-tek,34 an individual
plaintiff suit against the industry, Judge Weinstein allowed
claims of market share liability and negligence to go to the jury.35
On appeal the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York
Court of Appeals,36 which held that handgun manufacturers have
no special duty to crime victims regarding the marketing of their
products.37
In NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc.,38 a public nuisance suit brought
by a private association rather than a municipality, Judge
Weinstein tried the claims before an advisory jury in Spring
2003. Meanwhile, the New York Appellate Division affirmed the
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action of a similar public
nuisance case against the industry, brought by New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.39 Nonetheless, in AcuSport,
Judge Weinstein proceeded to render an opinion finding that the
industryís distribution practices created a public nuisance, but
Id. at 1150-51.
Cincinnatiís Council Decides to Drop Suit Against Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 2003, at A24.
32 Gregory Krote, Drop Suit, City Advised, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 30, 2003,
available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/04/30/loc_guncase30.html.
33 Id.
34 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y 1999), vacated sub nom., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
35 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835-36, 839.
36 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000).
37 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (N.Y. 2001).
38 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
39 People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), appeal
denied, 801 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 2003).
30
31

HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28

2004]

5/28/2004 4:19 PM

Suing the Firearms Industry

18

that the private association plaintiff lacked standing because it
did not suffer injury different in kind from that of the general
public.40 Reaching the merits and then dismissing for lack of
standing reversed the normal order of proceedingóif no standing
exists, no reason exists to address the merits.
Judge Weinsteinís holding that the industry is at fault was
based in large part on the false equation of traced guns with
ìcrime guns.î
He relied particularly on plaintiffís expert
testimony that guns in the trace database were crime guns.41 Yet
the court itself observed that ì[a] trace does not mean that the
FFL retailer or the first purchaser engaged in illegal or wrongful
activityî and that ì[p]laintiffís statistical experts . . . were unable
to identify specific dealers who had committed wrongdoing.î42
However, those facts did not prevent the firearm prohibitionist
lobby from using the same trace data to compile a list of what
they called the ten worst ìbad appleî gun dealers.43 Calling such
assertions ìmisleading,î BATF responded:
Many other factors ñ including high volume or sales; the type
of inventory carried and whether the gun [dealer] is located in
a high crime area ñ contribute to the percentages cited by the
Brady campaign.
. . . Gun traces, for example, indicate only that a gun has come
to the attention of law enforcement. They do not automatically
implicate a dealer or purchaser in any wrongdoing.
Large volume gun dealers will by their very frequency of sales
have more guns come to the attention of law enforcement than
a dealer who sells relatively few firearms.44
AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 504.
Mark Bowes, Gun Reportís Worth at Issue: Misleading, ATF Says of Findings,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 28, 2003, at B1. The media committed the same error.
E.g., Katie Cornell Smith & Marianne Garvey, N.Y. Gun Shop Shoots to 3rd on CrimeWeapon List, N.Y. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, at 17 (equating traced guns with ìcrime gunsî).
44 Press Release, ATF, Statement on Brady Campaign Allegations Regarding
Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers (July 16, 2003) (on file with author). The same
statistics from the AcuSport litigation were later used in a publication by an organization
calling itself ìAmericans for Gun Safetyî to support allegations such as ìChuckís Gun
Shop ranked No. 1 in the nation among stores that sold firearms that turned up in
criminalsí hands from 1996 to 2000.î Frank Main, Gun-safety Group Names 4 Area
Stores, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, Special Ed., at 9, available at
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-gun13.html.
However, as the article
noted:
The owner of Chuckís has never been charged with a crime. When the store
applied for a new federal firearms license last year, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives approved the request.
40
41
42
43

ìThere was no evidence of any criminal wrongdoing that would prevent him
from reapplying and getting a license,î ATF spokesman Tom Ahern said of
Chuckís owner John Riggio . . . .
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The extent to which information in trace records is subject to
disclosure has been controversial. Judge Weinstein ruled in the
AcuSport litigation that BATF had to disclose trace records to
plaintiffís experts but imposed a protective order ruling that the
experts could make public only the number of traces and the
identities of the licensees.45 Moreover, the end result of antiindustry litigation by the City of Chicago is that such records are
not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.46
In dismissing AcuSport, Judge Weinstein briefly addressed
the federal Second Amendment.47 Given that making and
distributing
a
constitutionally-protected
product
would
presumably not be a public nuisance, one might assume the right
to keep and bear arms to be pertinent in this case. Instead, the
opinion suggests that the scope of the right is virtually
meaningless and concludes that ìwhatever view is taken of the
Second Amendment is immaterial in this case. . . . There is no
justification in the federal Constitution for private persons failing
to exercise reasonable care in meeting their legal responsibility
to help ensure a safe society.î48

Id.

45 NAACP v. AcuSport Corp., 210 F.R.D. 268, app. B at 430-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(approving report and reserving discretion for court to modify stipulation on disclosure
between plaintiff and BATF). After the court dismissed the action, plaintiff moved the
court to allow the experts to disclose further information for use in academic publications
and in other lawsuits. Memorandum in Support of Application for Modification of the
Protective Order for the BATF Firearm Trace Database at 1, NAACP v. AcuSport Corp.,
210 F.R.D. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 99 Civ 3999, 99 Civ 7037). Judge Weinstein denied
the motion, commenting that ìno public interest overrides the governmentís interestî and
that ìthis case is dead.î Proceedings in open court, Oct. 27, 2003 (authorís notes).
46 See Depít of Justice, BATFE v. City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003) (mem.),
vacating & remanding 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court remanded the
case to consider the effect of an appropriations rider prohibiting ATF from disclosing
firearms trace records except as previously disclosed. See Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. J, tit. 6, ß 644, 117 Stat. 11, 473-74 (2003).
Congress considered that disclosure of the law enforcement databases in question ìwould
not only pose a risk to law enforcement and homeland security, but also to the privacy of
innocent citizens.î H.R. REP. NO. 107-575, at 20 (2002).
Before passage of the rider by Congress, the Solicitor General pointed to various
provisions of the Gun Control Act which deny records to BATF itself or limit disclosure of
records by law enforcement. Brief for the Petitioner at 24-25, Depít of Justice, BATFE v.
City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003) (No. 02-322) (ì[18 U.S.C.] Section 923(g)(3)(B)ís
strict prohibition on retention and release of multiple sales information by state and local
authorities would be wholly pointless if any member of the public could obtain the same
data from ATF pursuant to the FOIA [Freedom of Information Act].î). The Solicitor
General also stated that ìthe GCA specifically precludes ATF from imposing any system
for the registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions or dispositions.î
Id. at 26 (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 926(a)). See also 18 U.S.C. ß 923(g)(1)(D) (1996) (providing
that ATF may release licensee records only to a federal, state, or local law enforcement
agency and only in regard to ìpersons prohibited from purchasing or receiving firearmsî).
47 271 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63.
48 Id. at 462.
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Regardless of the meaning of the Second Amendment,49 the
state arms guarantees protect individual rights to obtain and
possess firearms. It seems curious that such guarantees have
been given such short shrift by some courts. Two decades ago,
the guarantee of the right of private citizens to bear arms under
the Illinois Constitution was cited in part as precluding an action
against handgun manufacturers for ultra-hazardous activity
giving rise to strict liability.50 However, that same constitutional
right did not merit mention in the recent decision of the Illinois
Court of Appeals upholding Chicagoís public nuisance suit
against the industry.51
Another case in point is the decision of the Indiana Supreme
Court in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp.52 The Indiana
Bill of Rights provides that ì[t]he people shall have a right to
bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.î53 In
prior precedent which upheld a civil rights claim against the City
of Gary for refusing to provide and process handgun carry
permits, the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
[This] right of Indiana citizens to bear arms for their own selfdefense and for the defense of the state is an interest in both
liberty and property which is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. . . . This interest is
one of liberty to the extent that it enables law-abiding citizens
to be free from the threat and danger of violent crime. There is
also a property interest at stake, for example, in protecting
oneís valuables when transporting them, as in the case of a
businessman who brings a sum of cash to deposit in his bank
across town.54

In Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the Indiana Court of
Appeals relied on the above in part in refusing to recognize a
public nuisance claim for manufacture and distribution of
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
As the Seventh Circuit explained:
We are also concerned that plaintiffsí argument would thwart Illinoisí policy
regarding possession of handguns. The right of private citizens in Illinois to
bear arms is protected, at least against all restrictions except those imposed by
the police power, by the Illinois Constitution. . . . The State of Illinois
regulates, but does not ban, the possession of handguns by private citizens. . . .
Imposing liability for the sale of handguns, which would in practice drive
manufacturers out of business, would produce a handgun ban by judicial fiat in
the face of the decision by Illinois to allow its citizens to possess handguns.
Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984).
51 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), appeal
granted, 788 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. 2003). Oral argument before the Illinois Supreme Court has
taken place and a decision on the appeal is pending. Christi Parsons, Justices Take Up
Firearms Control, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2003, Metro, at 1.
52 776 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), revíd, 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
53 IND. CONST. art. I, ß 32.
54 Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990).
49
50
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handguns.55 The court noted that the U.S. Congress and the
Indiana General Assembly pervasively regulated the
manufacture, distribution, sale, and use of handguns and, thus,
had evaluated the benefits and evils thereof. These legislative
bodies represented the people in the democratic process and
ìstruck the appropriate balance between the societal costs of
handguns and the historical right to bear arms.î56
The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the
complaint stated a claim against the firearms industry based on
allegedly wrongful sales practices, negligent designs, and
deceptive advertising.57 The court actually agreed with the
manufacturers that ìin every one of over 1,000 Indiana state
court and 50 federal public nuisance decisions,î public nuisance
claims were recognized only where a statute was violated or the
nuisance resulted from use of real property.58 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that a municipality has a viable claim for public
nuisance based on ìan unreasonable interference with a public
right,î even where the activity is lawful and does not involve
land.59
The Gary court cited the provisions of law dealing with the
sale of handguns and also fleetingly referred to Indianaís
constitutional guarantee that the citizens have a right to bear
Without any discussion of how exercise of a
arms.60
constitutional right could give rise to liability, the court
concluded that lawful activity could be conducted unreasonably
and give rise to nuisance.61
The court made no attempt to reconcile upholding the
deceptive advertising component of the public nuisance claim and
the constitutional right to bear arms (the most absolute element
of which is the right to keep arms in the home).62 The court
stated about that claim:
The City also asserts claims of misleading and deceptive
advertising and marketing of guns. . . . Specifically, the City
alleges that guns are presented as adding to a homeownerís
safety when in fact the opposite is true. . . . For the same
reasons applicable to the allegation of contributing to unlawful
776 N.E.2d at 387.
Id.
City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1227, 1247 (Ind. 2003).
Id. at 1231 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1234 (citing IND. CONST. art. I, ß 32 (right to bear arms) and IND. CODE ßß
35-47-2.5-1 to -15 (1998) (sale of handguns)).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 805 (Wis. 2003) (discussing the
unreasonableness of regulating ìsensible conductî on oneís private property).
55
56
57
58
59
60
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sales practices, we agree that these claims, if proven, state a
claim for injunctive relief based on an action for public
nuisance and negligence theories.63

Indianaís constitutional right to bear arms should have
resolved the fact that guns may add to a homeownerís safety.
The courtís holding questions the very legitimacy of this
provision and implies that the right to bear arms for defense is a
false value. Are we to accuse the framers and ratifiers of the
Indiana Constitution of deceptive advertising? In reality, the
question of homeowner safety and gun ownership is one that is
best left to the political process. It should be beyond the purview
of the courts to decide that the people of Indiana are incorrect in
the factual assumptions that underlie the constitutional right
they created.64
Despite the Gary courtís holding that a claim was stated in
the pleadings, whether the plaintiffs can prove their allegations
is another matter. The court itself agreed that ìlegislative policy
permitting lawful distribution of guns is relevant here.î65
Moreover, the court further recognized: ìThe conclusory
allegations of the complaint leave much unanswered. For the
reasons cited, there may be substantial barriers to recovery of
any or all of these damages.î66 In other words, the plaintiffsí
sweeping allegations that the members of the firearms industry
are somehow conniving conspirators intent on supplying
criminals with guns may be unprovable and false.

801 N.E.2d at 1247.
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (invalidating
Brady Act amendment to Gun Control Act and noting of comparison of constitutional
systems different from that of the United States, ìsuch comparative analysis [is]
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing oneî); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (stating that some
constitutional rights are not ìin some way less ëfundamentalí than [others]. Each
establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honoróto no
greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution.î); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956) (ìAs no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so
none should suffer subordination or deletion. . . . To view a particular provision of the Bill
of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it.î); Arnold v.
City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (ìWe are cognizant of the current
controversy that exists in Ohio and across our nation over the right of an individual to
possess firearms. . . . [I]t is our charge to determine and not to disturb the clear
protections provided by the drafters of our Constitution.î); State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94,
95 (Or. 1980) (ìWe are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of
a right to bear arms . . . . Our task, however, in construing a constitutional provision is to
respect the principles given the status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by the
drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the moment.î).
65 801 N.E.2d at 1244.
66 Id.
63
64
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III. ìNEGLIGENT MARKETINGî TO POLICE IN STATES WITH ìLESS
STRICTî GUN CONTROL: THE NINTH CIRCUITíS ILETO V. GLOCK
INC. DECISION
In 1999, Buford Furrow shot and wounded five persons at a
local Jewish Community Center in California and then shot and
killed Joseph Ileto, a postal worker, at a nearby locality.67 He
used a Glock pistol that had originally been sold to a police
department in the State of Washington and was later unlawfully
purchased by Furrow, who was ineligible to possess firearms.68
While aware that Furrow may have been in unlawful possession,
police failed to follow up. As a law enforcement officer noted
after the tragedy, ìWe planned to [search Furrowís home]; we
just hadnít gotten around to it yet.î69 The inevitable lawsuit was
filed against several firearm manufacturers and distributors, and
in Ileto, the Ninth Circuitóin a 2-1 opinion by Circuit Judge
Richard Paezóheld that the defendants who made or sold the
firearms used by Furrow could be subject to liability under
California tort law for negligence and public nuisance.70
The court held that sufficient factual issues over whether the
industry owed a duty of care and breached that duty were raised
by plaintiffsí allegations that ìthe defendants created an illegal
secondary firearms market that was intentionally directed at
supplying guns to prohibited gun purchasers like Furrow.î71
This is the mantra of the current onslaught of lawsuits against
the firearms industry, which would be shocking if supported but
seems more fantasy than reality. This is made clear in the more
particularized allegations of the complaint, which the court
summarizes as follows:
Plaintiffs allege that Glockís marketing and distribution
strategy includes the purposeful oversupply of guns to police
departments and the provision of unnecessary upgrades and
free exchange of guns with police departments to create a
supply of post-police guns that can be sold through unlicensed
dealers without background checks to illegal buyers at a profit.
Glock allegedly targets states like Washington, where the gun
laws are less strict than in California, in order to increase sales
to all buyers, including illegal purchasers, who will take their
guns into neighboring California. The ATF has provided Glock
with the names of the distributors who are responsible for the
sales of guns that end up in the hands of criminals, but Glock
Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1197.
Evening News with Dan Rather: Furrow Faces Death Penalty; Tragedy Revives
Gun Debate (CBS News television broadcast, Aug. 12, 1999).
70 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir. 2003).
71 Id. at 1204.
67
68
69

HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28

2004]

5/28/2004 4:19 PM

Suing the Firearms Industry

24

has ignored the information and continues to supply these
same distributors.72

Upholding the claims under such allegations raises serious
questions regarding the fundamental system of American
federalism, under which the states are free to experiment with
their own versions of republicanism. In the words of Justice
Brandeis: ìIt is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.î73
First, contrary to Ileto, it is not Glock but the State of
Washington that enacts ìgun laws [that] are less strict than in
California.î74 Indeed, almost all states in the United States have
gun laws that are less strict than California.75 While Californiaís
Constitution has no arms guarantee, the Washington Bill of
Rights provides: ìThe right of the individual citizen to bear arms
in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired.î76 The
Washington courts have held that this provision must be strictly
followed.77 Under plaintiffsí theory, would not the State of
Washington be ultimately responsible because it has ìless strictî
gun laws?
Second, it is difficult to blame Glock for the policies of
Washington police departments which result in, as alleged by
Ileto, ìthe purposeful oversupply of guns to police departments
and the provision of unnecessary upgrades and free exchange of
guns with police departments.î78 The premise of the complaint is
that police departments buy, upgrade, exchange, and sell too
many guns. Again, under plaintiffsí theory, would not the
Washington police departments be responsible because of their
own purchase and exchange policies?
In the final analysis, the question is raised of whether
California policymakers are entitled to play schoolmarm to the
policymakers of Washington and almost all other states. It
would make as much sense to allow victims of crime in
Id. at 1204-05.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
74 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1204-05.
75 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK, app. A (West 2003)
(summarizing state firearms laws).
76 WASH. CONST. art. I, ß 24.
77 E.g., State v. Spiers, 79 P.3d 30, 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a statute
ìunconstitutionally infringes on the right to bear arms by criminalizing firearm
ownership for persons merely charged with a ëserious offense,í regardless of whether they
have relinquished possessionî).
78 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1204.
72
73
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Washington to blame California and its police departments for
disarming law-abiding citizens and allowing armed criminals to
run amok, thereby allowing such criminals to spill over the
borders and commit crimes in Washington.79
Third, Ileto claims that ì[t]he ATF has provided Glock with
the names of the distributors who are responsible for the sales of
guns that end up in the hands of criminals, but Glock has
ignored the information.î80 This allegation is based on the
unwarranted insinuation that, because ATF has requested that
Glock trace certain firearms, the distributors to which Glock
transferred such firearms are criminals or knowingly sell guns to
criminals. Yet firearm traces mean little. Neither Washington
law nor federal law provides that a manufacturer may not sell
firearms to a distributor or dealer which has been the subject of
BATF trace requests.
It is simply false to suggest that traced firearms necessarily
have ìend[ed] up in the hands of criminals.î81 Nothing in the law
provides for revocation of firearms licenses based merely on the
number of traces. The federal Gun Control Act mandates license
revocation upon the willful violation of the law or regulations82
and provides authority to trace firearms,83 but nowhere implies
that traces are evidence of criminality of federally licensed
firearms manufacturers, importers, or dealers. Revocation of a
license based on the number of traces would violate the Gun
Control Act and basic due process.
Any number of reasons exist to explain why one dealer would
have more traces than another. The first would be sales
volumeóa large dealer which sells thousands of guns per year,
for instance, would obviously have more traces than a small
retailer. An urban dealer could have more traces because it does
business in a high crime area. The higher crime rate in such
areas does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing by the dealers or
their customers.84 For instance, persons who lawfully purchase
79 Indeed, in a hypothetical suit plaintiffs could turn the Ileto claims upside down
and allege that as a result of the adoption of the Ileto rule, the marketing and distribution
policies of firearm manufacturers have resulted in the undersupply of guns to Washington
police departments and law-abiding citizens, and it was foreseeable that plaintiff X would
be unable to obtain a firearm and protect herself from the crime described herein.
80 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1205.
81 Id. at 1205.
82 18 U.S.C. ß 923(e) (2002).
83 Id. ß 923(g)(7).
84 For instance, a federal court rejected a lawsuit against inexpensive handgun
makers for criminal acts based in part on the following:
[W]hile blighted areas may be some of the breeding places of crime, not all
residents of [such areas] are so engaged, and indeed, most persons who live
there are lawabiding but have no other choice of location. But they, like their
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firearms from licensed dealers may themselves be crime victims
by reason of having their firearms stolen. Stolen firearms which
are recovered will be traced and, in many instances, returned to
their owners.
Some dealers will always have a greater number or a higher
proportion of firearm traces than others. Statistically, all dealers
will never have an identical percentage of firearms traced. If the
dealers with an ìabove averageî number of traces were
eliminated, then the remaining set of dealers would also have an
ìabove averageî subset. The further elimination of ìabove
averageî dealers would ultimately leave just one dealer in the
universe. Yet, it is rather unremarkable that some dealers have
more traces than others. A world in which all dealers have a
ìbelow averageî number of traces is no more possible than one in
which ìall of the children are above average.î85
The Ileto court upheld a cause of action for breach of duty
based on the following more embellished allegations of the
complaint:
First, plaintiffs alleged that the ATF provided manufacturers
detailed reports of the distributors, dealers, and gun shows
that consistently supply the guns used in crimes. Plaintiffs
further alleged that the defendant manufacturers and
distributors failed to utilize distribution techniques that were
commonly used by other businesses to avoid distribution to
illegal end users. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that
Glock and other defendant manufacturers negotiate contracts
with distributors . . . and dealers that do not include basic
provisions to address the risk of acquisition of firearms by
prohibited purchasers despite the fact that other forms of
incentive provisions regularly were included in the contracts.
According to plaintiffs, the defendants also fail to utilize basic
training instruction that would help dealers and distributors
recognize straw buyers or avoid distribution to illegal
purchasers.86

As explained previously, ATFís requests for trace
information constitute no reliable index for ìguns used in crime.î
counterparts in other areas of the city, may seek to protect themselves, their
families and their property against crime, and indeed, may feel an even greater
need to do so since the crime rate in their community may be higher than in
other areas of the city. . . . To remove cheap weapons from the community may
very well remove a form of protection assuming that all citizens are entitled to
possess guns for defense.
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920, 929 (D.D.C. 1986).
85 Note the registered trademark of Garrison Keillor: ìWhere the women are strong,
the men are good looking, and all of the children are above average.î
http://www.prairiehome.org/content/trademarks.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
86 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1205.
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A study by the Congressional Research Service explains:
[A] law enforcement officer may initiate a trace request for any
reason. No crime need be involved. No screening policy
ensures or requires that only guns known or suspected to have
been used in crimes are traced. . . . [T]he extent to which trace
requests focus on guns not involved in crimes cannot be
determined . . . .87

As to the industryís failure to prevent ineligible persons from
ever obtaining firearms, all licensed firearm dealers are subject
to the federal Brady Act requirement that a criminal background
check must be conducted on transferees.88 They are held
criminally responsible for transferring a firearm to any person
they know or have reasonable cause to believe is ineligible to
They must also follow whatever
receive a firearm.89
requirements state law mandates.
The plaintiffs allege
essentially that federal and state law requirements are
insufficient and that somehow the members of the industry must
achieve a more perfect world in which no criminal ever obtains a
firearm.
Federal and state legislators have not figured out the
panacea for crime, yet the Ileto court insists that ìthe defendants
have the knowledge and the means to distribute guns in a
manner that would reduce the risk of access and use by
prohibited persons.î90 The court applies the same reasoning in
upholding the public nuisance claim. It seems, in the courtís
opinion, that the defendants ìmarket, distribute, promote, and
sell their products with reckless disregard for human life and for
the peace, tranquility, and economic well being of the public.î91
The court adds:
[T]he fact that the manufacture and sale of guns is legal does
not prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their nuisance claim.
87 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress; ìAssault Weaponsî: Military
Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues, 1992, app. B, at 66. The report explained
further:
For example, a trace may be conducted on a firearm found at the residence of a
suspect though the firearm itself is not associated with a criminal act. Traces
may also be requested with respect to abandoned firearms, those found by
chance, those seen by officers for sale at guns shows or pawn shops, or those
used by suicide victims. In addition, traces may be requested with respect to
firearms seized pursuant to an investigation not directly related with a violent
criminal offense, such as tax evasion or a technical violation of the Gun Control
Act provisions. It is not possible to identify how frequently firearms traces are
requested for reasons other than those associated with violent crimes.
Id. at 70.
88 18 U.S.C. ß 922(t)(1) (1996 & Supp. 2003).
89 Id. at ß 922(d).
90 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1206.
91 Id. at 1210.
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Here, the alleged nuisance is not premised on the legal
manufacture and design of the guns or the sale of guns to
individuals who are legally entitled to purchase them. On the
contrary, the nuisance claim rests on the defendantsí actions in
creating an illegal secondary market for guns by purposefully
over-saturating the legal gun market in order to take
advantage of re-sales to distributors that they know or should
know will in turn sell to illegal buyers.92

In short, an industry which abides by all federal and state
requirements should nonetheless know that it sells too many
products and must not ìover-saturateî the market. One can
imagine the application of this theory to the beer industry.
Brewers over-saturate the market knowing full well that some
customers under the age of twenty-one will buy beer.
Unscrupulous groceries and convenience markets merely card
buyers without developing sure-fire techniques of weeding out
straw purchasers (those persons over twenty-one purchasing for
those under twenty-one). Manufacturers are well aware of highviolation zones, such as college towns, yet still ship beer to
dealers at such places. Thus, the brewers must be responsible for
all alcohol related injuries and deaths.
In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall
wrote that the action was in reality a products liability action
and, therefore, was barred by a California statute that provided,
ì[i]njuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm
or ammunition are not proximately caused by its potential to
cause serious injury, damage, or death, but are proximately
caused by the actual discharge of the product.î93 In Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc.,94 the California Supreme Court rejected a similar
attempt to redefine a product liability action into a negligent
marketing action, which would have avoided that statute.95
Judge Hall wrote:
In Merrill, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant gun
manufacturer was negligent in that it marketed its guns to the
general public while knowing that the guns would find their
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotations omitted) (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE ß 1714.4(b)(2) (Deering 2002)).
94 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
95 Id. at 130. The Merrill court wrote:
[V]irtually every person suing for injuries from firearm use could offer evidence
the manufacturer knew or should have known the risk of making its firearm
available to the public outweighed the benefits of that conduct, and could
therefore raise a triable issue of fact for the jury. In each of these cases, the
jury would be asked to do precisely what section 1714.4 prohibits: weigh the
risks and benefits of a particular firearm. The result would be to resurrect the
very type of lawsuit the Legislature passed section 1714.4 to foreclose . . . .
92
93

HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28

29

5/28/2004 4:19 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:11

way to criminals. Here, appellants allege that the appellee gun
manufacturers were negligent by marketing their guns to law
enforcement while knowing that the guns will find their way to
criminals.
But appellantsí allegation that the gun
manufacturers purposefully ìover-marketedî their product to
law enforcement, which made the guns reach illegal markets
faster, is not legally cognizable. . . . In general, a manufacturer
of a legal product has no duty to refrain from attempting to sell
as many products as possible.96

Judge Hall also would have rejected the public nuisance
claim because such cases invariably related to the use of real
property not products.97 She concluded: ìThe debate over the
extent to which gun manufacturers should be held liable to
victims of gun violence belongs in the democratic process. The
public debate benefits from able advocates on all sidesówe need
not enter it.î98
On remand, should Ileto proceed through discovery and
summary judgment, plaintiffs will have to offer evidence that
firearm manufacturers and police departments are in cahoots to
distribute firearms to a vast criminal network. And, should the
case go to trial, they will have to convince a jury that by selling
guns to police the industry thereby arms the underworld. Ileto
well illustrates the extent to which the suits against the firearms
industry keep getting, in the words of Alice in Wonderland,
ìcuriouser and curiouser.î99
IV. THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, designated
as H.R. 1036 and sponsored by Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.), passed
the House of Representatives on April 9, 2003, with a 285 - 140
vote.100 It is described as ì[a] bill to prohibit civil liability actions
from being brought or continued against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for
damages resulting from the misuse of their products by
others.î101
The original Senate bill, S. 659, introduced by Senators
Larry Craig (R-Idaho) and Max Baucus (D-Mont.), contained

Id.

Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1222 n.3 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1224 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 11 (1974).
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003). See
also 149 CONG. REC. H2996-99 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003).
101 149 CONG REC. H2,863 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2003).
96
97
98
99
100
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identical language as H.R. 1036.102 Senator Thomas Daschle (D.S.D.), the Minority Leader, announced his support for the bill
subject to clarifying amendments.103 That led to the introduction
of S. 1805, the Daschle-Craig-Baucus version of S. 659.104 A
threatened filibuster did not materialize, as S. 1805 was debated
February 25-March 2, 2004.105 President Bush, who has stated
that he will sign the bill if it passes, urged the Senate to enact ìa
clean billî without amendments which would interfere with its
ultimate passage.106
However, the Senate voted to add to the bill controversial
provisions renewing the federal ìassault weaponsî prohibition,
which was scheduled to expire,107 and requiring background
checks at gun shows for transactions between unlicensed
persons.108 This led the proponents of S. 1805 to join its
opponents in voting against final passage of the amended bill,
which went down in flames by a vote of 8 to 90.109

S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003).
Press Release, Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, Daschle Announces Support for
Legislation Limiting Liability for Gun Manufacturers (Sept. 25, 2003),
http://daschle.senate.gov/~daschle/pressroom/releases/03/09/2003926416.html.
104 Senator Craig introduced S. 1805, which incorporates the Daschle amendments,
and S. Res. 1806, which is an unamended version of S. 659. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,711
(daily ed. Oct. 31, 2003).
105 150 CONG. REC. S1897-98 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2004).
106 Press Release, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, Unions,
Commerce and Conservation Organizations Urge Passage of S. 659, The ìProtection Of
Lawful Commerce In Arms Actî (Sep. 9, 2003), http://www.nraila.org/news/read/releases
.aspx?ID=3029. A policy statement by the Bush Administration states:
The Administration strongly supports Senate passage of S. 1805. The
Administration urges the Senate to pass a clean bill, in order to ensure
enactment of the legislation this year. Any amendment that would delay
enactment of the bill beyond this year is unacceptable. The manufacturer or
seller of a legal, non-defective product should not be held liable for the criminal
or unlawful misuse of that product by others. The possibility of imposing
liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others is an
abuse of the legal system, erodes public confidence in our Nationís laws,
threatens the diminution of a basic constitutional right and civil liberty, sets a
poor precedent for other lawful industries, will cause a loss of jobs, and
burdens interstate and foreign commerce. S. 1805 would help curb frivolous
litigation against a lawful American industry and the thousands of workers it
employs and would help prevent abuse of the legal system. At the same time,
the legislation would carefully preserve the right of individuals to have their
day in court with civil liability actions. These civil actions are enumerated in
the bill and respect the traditional role of the States in our Federal system
with regard to such actions.
Statement of Administration Policy, Executive Office of the President, Office of
Management and Budget, S. 1805 - Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (Feb. 24,
2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/108-2/s1805sap-s.pdf.
107 See 150 CONG. REC. S1971 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004).
108 Id. at S2,006-08.
109 Id. at S1,976.
102
103

HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28

31

5/28/2004 4:19 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 7:11

The following analyzes H.R. 1036 and S. 1805 (referred to
below as the Daschle version). While enactment of the substance
of these bills is uncertain, the support thereof by majorities in
both the House and Senate suggests that some version of the
bills may be enacted at a future time.
H.R. 1036 begins with significant Findings and Purposes,
none of which would be changed by the Daschle version.110 The
first Finding declares: ìCitizens have a right, protected by the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, to keep
and bear arms.î111 While that claim is being hotly debated in the
courts,112 Congress has passed similar declarations on three
previous occasions,113 and much of the scholarship supports the
individual rights interpretation.114 The Finding has significance
for two purposes.
First, given that having arms is a
constitutional right, it hardly makes sense to allow lawsuits
against manufacturers for making constitutionally-protected
products.115 Second, this right would provide federal jurisdiction
to preempt state law that may authorize lawsuits against the
industry merely for supplying this constitutionally-protected
product to ìthe peopleî whom the Second Amendment protects.116
Compare H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003), with S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003).
H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 2(a)(1) (2003).
Compare United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 232 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right), with Silveira v. Lockyer,
312 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees only
State militia power), rehíg denied, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying a rehearing en
banc over dissenting opinions by Judges Pregerson, Kozinski, Kleinfeld, and Gould), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2003).
113 Freedmenís Bureau Act, ch. 200, ß 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866) (ì[T]he right . . .
to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty,
personal security, . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to
and enjoyed by all the citizens . . . .î); Property Requisition Act, Pub. L. No. 274, 55 Stat.
742, 742 (1941) (prohibiting construction of law to allow requisition or registration of
ìfirearms possessed by any individual for his personal protection or sportî or ìto impair or
infringe in any manner the right of any individual to keep and bear armsî); Firearms
Ownersí Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, ß1(b)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 449, 449 (1986)
(declaring ìthe rights of citizens . . . to keep and bear arms under the second amendment
to the United States Constitutionî).
114 But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing scholarship supporting both sides of the issue).
115 See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Tort Liability for the Manufacture, Sale, and
Ownership of Handguns?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 364-72 (1983). That the existence of a
constitutional right limits state tort law is illustrated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (addressing ìthe extent to which the constitutional protections
for speech and press limit a Stateís power to award damages in a libel action brought by a
public official against critics of his official conduct.î).
116 This presupposes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second
Amendment (as it does most of the rest of the Bill of Rights) and that Congress is using
its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent State infringement
on the right. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998). But, Congress could do this under its militia
power as well. U.S. CONST. art. I, ß 8, cls. 15 & 16. As the Supreme Court long ago noted:
110
111
112
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Lawsuits have been commenced, the Findings continue,
against the firearms industry for damages and other relief for the
harm caused by criminals and other third parties who misuse
However, ì[t]he manufacture, importation,
firearms.117
possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the
United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local
laws.î118 Indeed, the federal Gun Control Act was originally
passed under the Commerce Clause,119 which is another
jurisdictional hook for the proposed bill. As the Findings recite,
businesses ìare engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution,
importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition that
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce,î and they should not be liable for the harm caused by
unlawful misuse of firearms that function as designed and
intended.120
Such imposition of liability on an industry abuses the legal
system, erodes public confidence in the law, ìthreatens the
diminution of a basic constitutional right and civil liberty,î121
destabilizes other industries in the free enterprise system of the
United States, andóagain, the clincher for federal jurisdictionó
îconstitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign
commerce of the United States.î122

All citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or
reserve militia of the United States as well as of the states, and, in view of this
prerogative of the general government . . . the states cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question [the Second Amendment] out of view,
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
117 H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 2(a)(2) (2003).
118 Id. ß 2(a)(3).
119 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). As is clear on its face, the
Arms Export Control Act was passed under Congressí authority to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. The National Firearms Act, by contrast, was passed under the tax
power and is part of the Internal Revenue Code. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S.
506, 511 (1937).
120 H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(4).
121 Statement of Administration Policy, supra note 106.
122 H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(5). Justification of the bill under the Commerce Clause seems to
be clear given the Supreme Courtís upholding of most legislation (including Gun Control
Act provisions) even purporting to be passed under that clause, particularly laws that
include findings that an activity affects interstate and foreign commerce and that include
elements requiring such commercial nexus. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 1630. Indeed, this bill
seeks to override attempts by single states to suppress commerce with foreign countries
and among other states. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing
liability on Austrian manufacturer and Georgia importer for sales to law enforcement in
Washington).
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Such liability actions, which have been commenced or
contemplated by the United States, various States,
municipalities, and private interest groups, are unprecedented
and are not ìa bona fide expansion of the common law.î123 The
sustaining of these actions by a ìmaverickî judge or jury would
expand liability in a manner never contemplated by the
Constitutionís Framers or by the federal or state legislatures.124
And now for yet another jurisdictional hook: ìSuch an expansion
of liability would constitute a deprivation of the rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed to a citizen of the United States
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.î125 Those rights would presumably include the
right to keep and bear arms and the right to due process of law.
The above constitutional aspects are further clarified in the
Purposes clause to the bill. The immediate purpose, of course, is
to prohibit causes of action against the firearms industry for
harm caused by criminals and others who unlawfully misuse
firearms.126 The values of the Second Amendment are reflected
further in the Purposes: ì[t]o preserve a citizenís access to a
supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful purposes,
including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or
recreational shooting,î and ì[t]o guarantee a citizenís rights,
privileges, and immunities, as applied to the States, under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
pursuant to section 5 of that Amendment.î127 Section 5 is, of
course, the Enforcement Clause.
After repeating the purpose of preventing such lawsuits from
imposing ìunreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign
commerce,î128 a new purpose is interjectedóthat of protecting
the First Amendment rights of members of the firearms industry,
including their trade associations, ìto speak freely, to assemble
peaceably, and to petition the Government for a redress of their
grievances.î129 These rights were undoubtedly included because
some of the suits alleged a conspiracy to defraud the public into
believing that firearms are useful for self-defense, that
associating and speaking together amounted to a plot to
oversupply police and the public with firearms so that the
criminal element could get them, and that petitioning Congress
against passage of various firearms prohibitions helped criminals
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(6).
Id.
Id.
Id. ß 2(b)(1).
Id. ß 2(b)(2), (3).
Id. ß 2(b)(4).
Id. ß 2(b)(5).
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to obtain firearms.130
The meat of the bill is contained in a single sentence: ìA
qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal
or State court.î Further, any such pending action ìshall be
dismissed immediately.î131 The remainder of the bill contains
various definitions which clarify the nature of the prohibited civil
actions in contrast with the types of traditional actions that are
unaffected.
The term ìqualified productî means a firearm, antique
firearm, ammunition, or a component part thereof ìthat has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.î132 The
term ìqualified civil liability actionî is defined as ìa civil action
brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product, or a trade association, for damages or
injunctive relief resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse
of a qualified product by the person or a third party.î133 In short,
no action at law or in equity may be filed against a gun maker or
seller where a criminal or other person unlawfully misused a
firearm. (The Daschle version would add the definition of
ìunlawful misuseî as ìconduct that violates a statute, ordinance
or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.î134
That would nip in the bud an action alleging an unlawful ìuseî
rather than ìmisuse.î)
The term ìpersonî includes an individual, corporation, other
specified groups, ìor any other entity, including any
governmental entity.î135 Thus, persons who could not file suit
include private as well as governmental entities, such as
municipalities, state attorneys general, and federal agenciesóall
of which have brought such suits in the past. Entities shielded
from such lawsuits are federal firearms licensees, including a
130 Among the defendants named in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
199902590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *1 (July 13, 2000), were the American
Shooting Sports Council, Inc., National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., and the
Sporting Arms & Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc.
131 H.R. 1036, ß 3.
132 Id. ß 4(4). As the bill specifies, the definition of ìfirearmî is limited to the two
ìfirearmî definitions in 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(3)(A) and (B), which include a weapon which
expels a projectile by the action of an explosive (or is designed or may be readily converted
to do so), and the frame or receiver of such weapon. That excludes the definitions of
firearm in (C) and (D) respectively as a firearm muffler or silencer, and as a destructive
device, which includes explosive devices and certain non-sporting firearms with barrels
over .50 caliber. The billís definition of ìfirearmî also includes an antique firearm, which
ß 921(a)(16) defines to include firearms made before 1898 and certain replicas. The
definition of ìammunitionî may be found in ß 921(a)(17), and includes both ammunition
and components.
133 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A).
134 S. 1805, 108th Cong. ß 4(9) (2003).
135 H.R. 1036, ß 4(3).
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ìmanufacturerî (a person engaged in the business of
manufacturing a qualified product in interstate or foreign
commerce)136 and a ìsellerî (which includes a firearm importer or
dealer or a person engaged in the business of selling
ammunition).137 The term ìengaged in the businessî refers to a
person who devotes time, attention, and labor to the activity in
question as a regular course of trade or business with the
principal objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or
distribution of the product.138
Also exempted is a ìtrade association,î which is any nonprofit association or business, regardless of whether
incorporated, of which at least two members are manufacturers
or sellers of a qualified product.139 The Daschle version would
add the further meaning that the association ìis involved in
promoting the business interests of its members, including
organizing, advising, or representing its members with respect to
their business, legislative or legal activities in relation to the
manufacture, importation or sale of a qualified product.î140 This
would further clarify the legitimate nature of such organizations
and their First Amendment right to freedom of association.
As noted above, a qualified civil liability action may not be
brought in any court. However, five types of causes of action are
excluded from the definition of ìqualified civil liability action,î
and may continue to be brought.141 They include the following:
ì(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under
section 924(h) of title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or
identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the
conduct of which the transferee is so convictedî142 The referenced
section punishes ì[w]hoever knowingly transfers a firearm,
knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of
As noted, the
violence . . . or drug trafficking crime.î143
transferor must be convicted of this or a comparable state
offense, and the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime of
which the transferee is convicted must directly harm the party
who would bring an action.
Id. ß 4(2).
Id. ß 4(6) (referring to 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(9), which defines ìimporter,î ß 921(a)(11),
which defines ìdealer,î and ß 921(a)(17), which defines ìammunitionî).
138 Id. at ß 4(1) (referring to 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(21), which defines ìengaged in the
businessî).
139 Id. at ß 4(8).
136
137

140 S. 1805, ß 4(8)(C).
141 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A).
142 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
143 18 U.S.C. ß 924(h) (1996) (defining

crime of violence as in ß 924(c)(3) (felonies
involving use or threat of force against person or property) and drug trafficking crime as
in ß 924(c)(2) (federal drug felonies)).
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ì(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent
The term ìnegligent
entrustment or negligence per seî144
entrustmentî means:
the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by
another person when the seller knows or should know the
person to whom the product is supplied is likely to use the
product, and in fact does use the product, in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person
and others.145

(The Daschle version would say ìor othersî.)146 That might
mean supplying a firearm to an irresponsible youth or to a
person known to be mentally ill. An action involving ìnegligence
per seî might include, for instance, the sale of a firearm to a
known violent felon.
ì(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product knowingly and willfully violated a State or
Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product,
and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which
relief is soughtî147 The Daschle version would strike ìknowingly
and willfully,î reflecting the fact that the federal Gun Control Act
requires proof that specific offenses be proven as either knowing
or willful.148 However, some state firearm statutes have been
interpreted to impose a ìknew or reasonably should have knownî
standard akin to civil cases,149 or even to impose strict liability.150
In such states, depending on how broadly a court interpreted
proximate cause, this portion of the Daschle amendment may not
H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
Id. ß 4(5)(B).
S. 1805, ß 4(5)(B).
H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Compare Robinson v. Howard Bros. of
Jackson, Inc., 372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979) (holding that the sale of a pistol to a person
who certified that he was over twenty-one years of ageóbut whose driverís license
indicated that he was actually twenty years oldóviolated the Gun Control Act but was
not the proximate cause of the unforeseeable murder), and Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev.
Corp., 647 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1982) (holding that a gun seller was entitled to summary
judgment because ìfederal statutes regulating firearm sale did not create a duty on a
seller in a negligence action nor did it create a private right of action for damagesî), with
Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that whether sale of a
firearm to a felon whose civil rights were restored and whose purchase was approved by
sheriff could be reasonably foreseen to result in murder was a question for the jury).
148 S. 1805, ß 4(5)(A)(iii).
149 In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 299, 312 (Cal. 2000) (holding that defendant knew or
should have known that rifle was an ìassault weaponî).
150 See State v. Pelleteri, 683 A.2d 555, 557-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(holding that no scienter element is required regarding assault weapon ban, in that
ìknowledge of the character of the weapon is not an element of the offenseî). By contrast,
federal law requires proof of knowledge of ìthe characteristics that brought [the weapon]
within the statutory definition.î Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).
ì[T]here is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in
this country.î Id. at 610.
144
145
146
147
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preclude the types of lawsuits sought to be prohibited.
The Daschle version would also add to the above language
clauses explicitly including cases in which a manufacturer or
seller ìknowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make
appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under
Federal or State law;î151 or aided, abetted, or conspired with any
person either in making a false statement regarding a fact
material to the lawfulness of the sale of a qualified product,152 or
to sell such product, ìknowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that the actual buyerî was prohibited from receipt of a
firearm under federal law.153 These are crimes which typically
would involve sales directly to prohibited persons or ìstraw salesî
in which a prohibited person obtains a firearm using a proxy to
conduct the transaction. Once again, the proximate cause
requirement would exist for civil liability.
ì(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in
connection with the purchase of the productî154 Actions for breach
of contract or warranty arise in diverse circumstancesófor
instance, a firearm was not delivered when due or did not work
properly where needed155óbut in this context such conduct is
exempted from causes of action related to ìthe criminal or
unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third
party.î156 While it is unclear what causes of action might arise in
that context, the exemption for those arising under contract and
warranty is probably listed just to show that those actions
generally are unaffected by the bill.
ì(v) an action for physical injuries or property damage
resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the
product, when used as intendedî157 This is the classic strict
product liability case, and the bill clearly exempts such
traditional actions. The Daschle version would add, ìor [when
used] in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable,î provided that
ìëreasonably foreseeableí use does not include any criminal or
unlawful misuse of a qualified product, other than possessory
offenses.î158 The exclusion of unlawful misuse is consistent with
S. 1805, ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(I) (this is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß 922(m)).
Id. ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(II) (such a false statement is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß
922(a)(6)).
153 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(III) (such a transfer is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß 922(d)).
154 H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 4(5)(A)(iv) (2003) (emphasis added).
155 E.g., Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967) (involving situation where a rifle allegedly failed to discharge while the plaintiff
was hunting big game).
156 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A).
157 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
158 S. 1805 ßß 4(5)(A)(v), 4(5)(C).
151
152
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traditional legal norms.159 However, it is unclear what effect on
the lawsuits at issue will stem from the condition that unlawful
possession may be reasonably foreseeable.
The Daschle version would add a rule of construction that
the above exceptions ìshall be construed so as not to be in conflict
and no provision of this Act shall be construed to create a Federal
private cause of action or remedy.î160 This is a statement about
the perils of legal linguistics and how lawyers have the ability to
twist imperfectly worded rules. Under this clause, one exception
would not trump another. Further, nothing in the enactment
would create a new basis for actions against the firearms
industry.
As noted, the above legislation has a good chance of passage.
If it does, it will be challenged as beyond Congressí power,
violative of federalism, and inconsistent with due process. One
can be sure that novel theories will be devised to attack the
firearms industry.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current nationally-orchestrated efforts to suppress the
firearms industry through litigation is premised on the theory
that federal and state firearms laws do not go far enough and
that the industry is to blame for not creating a more perfect
world than the Congress or the state legislatures have devised.
Indeed, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, as
guaranteed by the Second Amendment and most state
constitutions, and the manufacture and distribution of firearms,
which are necessary to the exercise of that constitutional right,
are depicted as being a public nuisance.
It is hardly a secret that this onslaught of litigation is
primarily promoted by special interest lobbies that have failed to
prohibit firearms ownership through the legislative process and
have turned to the courts to obtain judicial legislation. While
most courts have rejected this end run around the democratic
process, some have embraced an activist role. Congress would be
fully warranted in passing preemption legislation to end this
disruption of a legitimate form of commerce, which is itself a
penumbra of a basic constitutional right.

159 Restatement (Third)
160 S. 1805, ß4(5)(D).

of Torts: Product Liability ß 2 cmt. p (1997).

